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The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of
Personal Jurisdiction
Harold S. Lewis, Jr. *
I. Introduction
Few fields of legal thought have been as plagued by a penchant
for abstraction as has personal jurisdiction. Even as today's Supreme
Court mocks the metaphysics of an earlier era, its own state-court
jurisdiction decisions remain infected by notions equally as vague,
and counterproductive and unworkable as well. One example is the
Court's concept of "state sovereignty," which purports to employ
personal jurisdiction restrictions to protect the sovereign interests of
the several states. In the past the Court has asserted that the forum's
own interests are a factor in whether the forum may fairly adjudicate
a civil dispute. More recently, it has suggested that sovereignty con-
cerns may divest a court of jurisdiction even if the forum is fair to the
parties.1 This article examines the resilience of state sovereignty in
the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. It contends that the concept
died a third death last Term with the Supreme Court's decision in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,2 points to
some lessons to be drawn from this history, and highlights the Ireland
decision's larger significance for personal jurisdiction.
Part II identifies the abstract antecedents of state sovereignty
that served as the centerpiece ofPennoyer v. Neff 3 It then discusses the
role played by state sovereignty and its cognate construct of "forum
state interest" in the comprehensive framework that dominated per-
sonal jurisdiction decisions from Pennoyer until International Shoe Co. v.
* Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. A.B., Columbia Col-
lege, 1969; J.D., Stanford University, 1972. The author is grateful to Becky J. Dasher and
Charles P. Taylor, students at Mercer University School of Law, for their editorial and re-
search assistance in the preparation of this article. Of particular value were the thoughtful
comments on a draft version of the article by Professors Martin Redish, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law; Bruce Posnak, Mercer University School of Law; and John Drobak,
Washington University School of Law.
1 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289-94 (1980). See text
accompanying notes 40-42, 67-68, 75 infta.
2 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
3 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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Washi'ngton .4 The author contends that, properly understood, the
Court's fundamental reconceptualization of personal jurisdiction in
International Shoe should have rendered obsolete both state sover-
eignty and its cousin, forum state interest, as determinants of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Part III observes how the sovereignty concept, following the lead
of forum state interest, nevertheless resurfaced in the oft-cited dictum
of Hanson v. Denckla5 that personal jurisdiction limitations "are a con-
sequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States."'6 The article takes issue with Hanson's evident premise that
state sovereign interests, as opposed to the rights of individual civil
litigants, are of distinct jurisdictional concern after International Shoe.
It therefore applauds what appeared to be the Court's summary exe-
cution of the Hanson sovereignty reference in Shaffer v. Heiner.7
Part III then turns to the unaccountable rebirth of state sover-
eignty only three years later in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,8
again through observations entirely unnecessary to the decision. The
article argues that the attempted resuscitation was particularly un-
warranted because it was based on a distorted reading of International
Shoe; it relied on Hanson's reference to sovereignty without mention-
ing that Shafer had, at the very least, cast grave doubt on its continu-
ing vitality; and it ignored the thrust of two contemporaneous
decisions9 that had further eroded the premises of sovereignty.
Finally, Part III relates how the Supreme Court, in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, approved an exercise of jurisdiction predicated on a
theory of implied consent or waiver, despite the absence of demon-
strated defendant-forum contacts of the kind that the Court had de-
clared indispensable since Shafer. The Court thus came to grips with
the apparent inconsistency between the Shafer Court's pronounce-
ment that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the [contacts-based] standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny"' 10 and pre-Shafer decisions upholding jurisdic-
tion based on consent alone. In doing so, the Court recognized for
the first time what should long since have been clear: that the due
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
6 Id. at 251.
7 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
8 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1977).
10 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
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process clause' is the only constitutional restriction on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts; that the sole interest protected, therefore,
is "individual liberty," exclusive of state sovereignty; and, accord-
ingly, that the objection to personal jurisdiction, like any other objec-
tion grounded in an individual constitutional right, is subject to
defeasance through the operation of consent, waiver, or estoppel.
This recognition, in turn, compelled Ireland's implicit acknowledge-
ment that the World-Wide concept of sovereignty, announced just two
years earlier, does not in fact operate as an "independent restriction
on the sovereign power of the court." 12
Part IV compares the personal jurisdiction situation with other
contexts in which the Court, having embraced a rule of decision
based on "inherent" attributes of federalism, soon had to do an ab-
rupt about face. Although some of the governmental interests the
sovereignty concept seeks to serve are surely legitimate and even con-
crete, the doctrine that asserts their significance for personal jurisdic-
tion purposes is woefully abstract and pregnant with mischief. The
Court failed in Hanson and World- Wide to provide workable criteria
for deciding when another state's sovereign prerogatives would be
unduly invaded by a forum state's asserting jurisdiction, just as, in
earlier cases, the Court had been unable to identify circumstances in
which the forum state's own interests would suffice for jurisdiction in
the absence of the ordinary indicators of forum fairness. The article
argues that these government interests should find expression in the
resolution of choice-of-law issues rather than as limitations on per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Last, Part IV explores the implications of Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land for the future of personal jurisdiction. Since the Court, so soon
after World-Wide, reached so far to dispose of state sovereignty, 13 this
third death of the concept should prove more durable. Further, the
premise underlying the Ireland decision-that only the individual lib-
erty interests of the parties are properly considered in the personal
jurisdiction decision 14 -augurs well for the elaboration of jurisdic-
tional doctrine. If that premise takes root, it should sound the death
knell not only for sovereignty but also for sovereignty's persistent
companion, the doctrine of forum state interest. Ireland could thus
clear both major governmental interest obstructions from the path of
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12 102 S. Ct. at 2104-05 n.10.
13 See text accompanying notes 138-41 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 129-34 and 196-98 infra.
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personal jurisdiction adjudication, paving the way for theoretical
unification of the entire body of the Court's decisions since Interna-
tional Shoe around the individual rights of litigants.
II. Historic Origins and Apparent Obsolescence
The idea of the forum as sovereign over persons and property
"found" within its borders is of course at the heart of the Pennoyer
decision.' 5 With the conspicuous exception of jurisdiction founded
on consent, 16 the categories of state court jurisdiction approved in
Pennoyer assumed that either the defendant himself or his property
could be literally or figuratively seized by forum state agents. The
"tagging" basis of jurisdiction rested on the fortuity that a transient
defendant might be served with summons and complaint within the
state-a metaphysical manifestation of state authority over the de-
fendant. 17 To secure the kind of quasi in rem jurisdiction attempted
in Pennoyer, an agent of the forum state could, at plaintiff's instance,
seize the defendant's forum-sited property, with the consequence that
jurisdiction would attach to the extent of the value of the property
seized, even if it were wholly unrelated to the plaintiff's claim. 18
"True" in rem jurisdiction was an afortiori case: the very "object of
the action ' 19 was within the state's boundaries and, accordingly, sub-
ject to execution by the state's judicial agents. Finally, in status
cases, it is the parties' relationship itself which is conceptually located
in the forum state. That relationship is arguably analogous to the in
15 See Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor in PersonalJurisdiction Adjuidication: Home-Court
Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 773 (1982). Professor Ripple and
Ms. Murphy state that the "fundamental concern" of Pennoyer was "state sovereignty." Rip-
ple & Murphy, World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reftctions on the RoadAhead, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 65, 70 (1980).
16 At first blush domicile might appear another exception. As later clarified by Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), domicile is a sufficient basis for extraterritorial service over any
nonresident defendant, even one who owns no forum-sited property, when he "sojourns with-
out the forum state." Id. at 463-64. The Court in Milliken did not grapple with the definition
of domicile employed by the forum court. If, however, a prerequisite to a finding of domicile
for jurisdictional purposes is that the nonresident defendant maintain some personal or physi-
cal presence in the forum-a very likely possibility under modern fairness concepts-then
domicile, too, may be firmly planted in the Pennoyer ground of sovereign power over the in-
forum person or property of the defendant.
17 See Posnak, A Uniform Approach to JudicialJurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition
of the "Gotcha" Theog, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 729 n.2 (1981).
18 95 U.S. at 727-28.
19 95 U.S. at 727. Cf Shaffir, 433 U.S. at 207 ("[W]hen claims to the property itself are
the source of the underlying controversy .. .it would be unusual for the State where the
property is located not to have jurisdiction").
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rem "res. ' '2°
There is strong evidence that the basic Pennoyer sovereignty con-
cept was so abstract as to foreordain its demise. Much of that evi-
dence is supplied by the failure of some of its mechanisms to serve
their intended purposes in practice. For example, the Court's "hold-
ing" in Pennoyer, on whatever constitutional provision it may rest,21
seems to be that published notice (and presumably also actual no-
tice) in a "personal" action against a nondomiciliary defendant who
is not served with process while within the forum state cannot be the
basis of a binding judgment against him unless he happens to have
an interest in some forum-sited property that is seized when the ac-
tion commences.2 2 The Court's repudiation of the state court's juris-
diction turned on the fact that the nonresident defendant's property
had not been seized until after that action had commenced. The
Court rationalized its timing requirement as necessary to ensure
against the risks of hollow judgments and forum state embarrassment
that could result whenever there was no property to levy on after a
judgment for the plaintiff.23
Those risks, however, will not be obviated in three of the juris-
dictional classifications that the Pennoyer dicta approved. The non-
resident defendant "tagged" within a state may well have no
property there amenable to the satisfaction of a judgment. The same
could be true of a forum domiciliary; any property he might have in
the forum at the commencement of an action may be spirited outside
the forum before the sheriff levies execution. Similar difficulties at-
tend even a classical action in rem. If the object of the action is capa-
ble of removal from the state, as would be true in cases of replevin, a
plaintiff's judgment may turn out to be as hollow as if the court had
declared his right to damages in an action in personam, for the de-
fendant may have no other forum property.2 4
20 See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(child custody); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (divorce).
21 Whatever the Court actually held in Pennoyer, it could not have rested its holding on
the fourteenth amendment, which was not in effect at the time the Oregon state court as-
sumed jurisdiction. 95 U.S. at 733. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 572 (1958); Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112,
1115 n.25 (1981); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State CourtJurisdictio.: A Historical-
Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 504-05 (1981).
22 95 U.S. at 727-28.
23 Id. at 728.
24 In a pure status case, the "res," theoretically within the forum, has no physical embod-
[Vol. 58:699]
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Thus the specific modes of jurisdiction Pennoyer approves fall
short of avoiding the practical pitfalls with which the Court pur-
ported to be concerned. This reinforces the suspicion that at bottom
the Penno yer jurisdictional prescriptions are not functionally
grounded and amount to little more than an abstract pastiche of the
"eternal principles of justice, ' 25 "public law," 26 and the law of na-
tions27 from which they are directly descended.28
Given the Pennoyer majority's less than overwhelming fidelity to
the state power principles it espouses, sovereignty may instead be
viewed as merely a mechanism for measuring the rights of individual
litigants by reference to the convenient, historic yardstick of state
boundaries. Consistent with this view is the Court's description of
personal jurisdiction rules as designed "for the protection and en-
forcement of private rights. '29 In this connection it may not be acci-
dental that the dissent, rather than the majority, considered public
interests paramount over those of the defendant. Justice Hunt ar-
gued that the majority's rejection of Oregon's jurisdiction on a tim-
ing technicality subordinated Oregon's "sovereign" authority over all
property "actually being within its limits"-authority necessary for
Oregon to "subject the same to the payment of debts justly due to its
citizens."30
The majority's underlying focus on private rights helps explain
how it could sanction jurisdiction based entirely on consent, for ex-
ample, even where the defendant had no property within the forum's
borders. The Court may have been moved to approve such jurisdic-
iment and hence is incapable of literal seizure and cannot possibly serve to satisfy any money
judgment.
25 Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
26 Pennojer, 95 U.S. at 722; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407
(1855).
27 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977).
28 See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855); Mills v. Duryee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,486 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Kurland,supra note 21, at 570-72
(1958); McDougal,JuialJuridiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Anal si , 35 VAND. L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1982); Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 69-70; Comment, Long-Am and Quasiin Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MIcu. L. REv. 300, 303-04 (1970).
29 95 U.S. at 733.
30 Id at 737 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Thus Professor Whitten argues that the sole, proper
concern of the Court in Pennoyer should have been with territorial limitations on sovereignty.
Professor Whitten also states that the Court erroneously addressed sovereignty as a problem-
of due process rather than full faith and credit. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-
CourtJurisdiction" A Histoncal-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 839 n.428, 846 (1981). In this view, the




tion just because it recognized that jurisdiction acquired through ac-
tual, uncoerced consent would not trample on individual rights.
Still, the opinion does pay linguistic homage to sovereignty at every
turn, including the announcement that the authority of every judi-
cial tribunal "is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the
State in which it is established." 3' Pennoyer, then, sits astride the ten-
sion between, on the one hand, a perhaps ultimate but certainly un-
derstated concern for individual rights, and, on the other, the long
tradition of expressing jurisdictional limitations in terms of public or
sovereign power. It is therefore not surprising that the Court would
reflect this tension in succeeding years by employing public law ter-
minology to uphold exercises of jurisdiction that the Court consid-
ered fair as between the parties, but that could not be justified under
a rigorous application of any of the particular sovereignty-based
modes of jurisdiction that Penno yer approved.
The evolution of sovereignty is most marked in the doctrine of
forum state interest. The Coiirt first invoked state interests to ap-
prove the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and
others who had transacted affairs within a forum, but had left behind
no physical or personal presence on which state sovereign authority
could operate. In these cases the "public interest" 32 of the forum
state was endowed with critical, apparently dispositive jurisdictional
significance, amidst circumstances that could not have supported ju-
risdiction under the categories created by Pennoer.33
In the nonresident motorist cases, 34 the Court vainly attempted
to isolate the kind of forum state interests that would warrant devia-
tions from the Pennoyer restrictions. At first it identified a state inter-
est in regulating dangerous instrumentalities. 35 Finally, however, the
Court was compelled to expand the state interest concept to embrace
any activity, dangerous or not, in which the forum, through legisla-
tion, has expressed a particular interest.3 6
To those steeped in a new tradition which emphasizes fairness to
litigants over the limits of sovereignty, reliance on the presence or
absence of a forum state's interest in the litigation seems grossly mis-
placed. The presence of a strong forum interest in opening its courts
to a plaintiff's claim is wholly fortuitous from the standpoint of the
31 95 U.S. at 720.
32 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
33 See generall.y Lewis, supra note 15, at 775-81.
34 Eg., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
35 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
36 See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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defendant and does not even tend to show that the forum is fair to
him. By the same token, if a forum is fair to the defendant, the ab-
sence of a forum state interest in hearing the case should not preclude
the plaintiff from pursuing his claim there. Before International Shoe,
to be sure, reliance on the interests of states to bridge the doctrinal
gap between Penno yer's territorial tests and judges' expanding hori-
zons of jurisdictional fairness was a natural byproduct of the abstract
rhetoric about sovereignty for which Pennoyer, then as now, was prin-
cipally known. But the question raised by the Court's most recent
references to sovereign limitations on jurisdiction is whether Interna-
tional Shoe's preference for private rights over public law should have
supplanted the historical solicitude for sovereignty altogether. To
answer this question, we must place in fuller perspective certain er-
rant remarks in Chief Justice Stone's momentous opinion for the
Court.
The starting point in International Shoe was the proposition, cited
to Pennoyer, that the defendant's "presence within the territorial juris-
diction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment per-
sonally binding him."' 37 The Court continues, however, in a very
different vein:
But now .. .due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 38
The Court's clear concern here is with "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" from the standpoint of the defendant, not the sovereign. This is
confirmed by the succeeding discussion, in which the Court, by refer-
ence to previous decisions, classifies the factual configurations that
make jurisdiction fair to defendants based on their forum contacts.3 9
Recently, though, in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, the
Court has identified two passages from Chief Justice Stone's opinion
in International Shoe as support for the Court's lingering concern with
sovereign power and Pennoyer's territorially defined restrictions.4°
The first is the statement in International Shoe that the demands of due
process "may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
37 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citingPennoyer, 95 U.S. at
733).
38 326 U.S. at 316 (footnotes omitted).
39 Id at 317.
40 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
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state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particu-
lar suit which is brought there."'41 The second is Chief Justice Stone's
Delphic observation that jurisdictional due process depends on "the
quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation to thefair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. '42
Contrary to the import of World- Wide, the quoted passages do
not even suggest that the interests of the forum or of any other state
may substitute for the defendant's forum contacts, or that a forum
which is fair in light of the parties' interests will be precluded from
adjudicating by notions of sovereignty or state interest. On its face,
the first passage says only that the "context of our federal system of
government" is the framework within which to assess whether the
defendant's forum contacts make it "reasonable" for the defendant to
"defend a particular suit which is brought there." The discussion
before and after that sentence identifies these "contacts" as the activ-
ities of a defendant within or affecting a putative forum.43
Moreover, even though the State of Washington, the forum in
International Shoe, had an unusually strong interest in facilitating the
particular suit-among other reasons because it also happened to be
the plaintiff-the Court made no mention of Washington's interests
as a reason for upholding jurisdiction. This silence acquires addi-
tional significance when contrasted to Justice Black's insistence that
jurisdiction should have been upheld on the ground of state interests
alone.44 The reference, therefore, to "the context of our federal sys-
tem of government" appears to mean nothing more than that, in "a
nation composed of states, state boundaries furnish a history-hal-
lowed, if somewhat arbitrary, matrix within which it is convenient to
assess the jurisdictional significance of the conduct of a defendant. '45
The second passage that the Court in World- Wide cited as sup-
port for viewing jurisdiction as a function of sovereignty appears
equally pegged, in context, to the process due defendants. In a very
41 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added).
42 ld. at 319 (emphasis added).
43 Id at 316-17.
44 Id at 323-26 (Black, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Black's views concern-
ing forum state interests, see Lewis, supra note 15, at 784-85.
45 Lewis, supra note 15, at 786. Professor Ripple and Ms. Murphy more cautiously state
that the Court's reference in International Shoe to the "context of our federal system of govern-
ment" creates "doctrinal ambiguity with respect to the continued viability of state sover-
eignty as a significant constitutional policy concern." Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 71.
[Vol. 58:699]
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general sense due process does, of course, deal with the "fair and or-
derly administration of the laws." But that phrase could refer, not
just to personal jurisdiction, but to any of the many settings in which
due process applies: to the standards that should govern the validity
of pre-judgment security devices;46 to choice of law;4 7 to the "inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies"; 48 to the "shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies";49 to the "plain-
tiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief";50 to the
"forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute"; 51 or, for that
matter, to methods for selecting judges or relieving calendar
congestion.
Personal jurisdiction is the only one of these settings that is perti-
nent to the use of this amorphous phrase in International Shoe. And
the meaning of the phrase as it appears in the decision can best be
gleaned by examining the standards the Court actually employed for
deciding the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
irreducible reality is that the only tests International Shoe provided to
structure the fair and orderly disposition of those motions are ad-
dressed to the current or historical forum contacts of the defendant.
This is illustrated in the sentence immediately following the "fair
and orderly" phrase, where the Court reiterated that due process
condemns exercises ofjurisdiction by a forum with which the defend-
ant "has no contacts, ties, or relations." 52 In particular, the Court
eschewed reliance on the undoubtedly strong interest of the State of
Washington in asserting its own jurisdiction so as to assure itself a
convenient forum and a hospitable governing substantive law. It is
therefore more than a little puzzling that the modern court, 53 echoed
by commentary,54 has traced the origins of "interstate federalism" to
Chief Justice Stone's "fair and orderly administration of the laws."
46 See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
47 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).




52 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
53 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293-94.
54 Casenote, Retracting the Long Anrm: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and
Rush v. Savchuk, 22 B.C.L. REV. 385, 386 (1981).
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III. Two Rebirths in the Cradle of Dictum, Two Summary
Executions by Footnote
A. Hanson and Shaffer: Sovereignoy-s Reemergence and Apparent
Extinction
Although International Shoe ignored the interests of the State of
Washington, the forum state interest doctrine continued to enjoy cur-
rency in the Court's next few decisions.55 By contrast, the historic
sovereignty theory for a time remained quiescent. But in Hanson v.
Denckla,5 6 the Court, after noting the evolution of personal jurisdic-
tion requirements from the "rigid rule" of Pennoyer to the "flexible
standard" of International Shoe, warned:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [triggered by International
Shoe] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are more than a guaran-
tee of immuni from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a
defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the "mini-
mal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise
of power over him.5 7
Did the Court mean that a forum might lack the power to pro-
ceed even if minimal contacts were shown? Certainly the International
Shoe Court had not so intimated. Nor had International Shoe suggested
that a minimal burden on the defendant would warrant jurisdiction
despite the absence of contacts. Chief Justice Stone's calculus did
not measure fairness directly, according to the forum's convenience
to a given defendant, but only indirectly, through measures of de-
fendant-forum contacts designed to ensure that a forum would be at
55 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950). These decisions apparently relied on Intemationa Shoe as justification for
considering the forum state's interest as a jurisdictional factor. See Note, Measuring the Long
Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 132 n.41, 134 n.55 (1978). Justice Bren-
nan, for example, dissenting in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, writes: "The
'orderly administration of the laws' provides a firm basis for according some protection to the
interests of plaintiffs and Stales as well as of defendants." 444 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
Yet the first of the forum state interest decisions-Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, (1916)-
antedated International Shoe by twenty-nine years, and Intenational Shoe itself is silent on the
matter, under circumstances that would imply, if anything, the Court's disapproval of the
doctrine. See text accompanying notes 46-47, 54-55 suipra.
56 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
57 Id at 251 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See International Shoe v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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least minimally "fair" as between the parties, even if somewhat in-
convenient to the defendant.
Thus, the statement in Hanson that the personal jurisdiction re-
strictions prevalent after International Shoe are "a consequence of terri-
torial limitations on the power of the respective States" may merely
confirm two established, pedestrian features of personal jurisdiction
adjudication: First, that the dominant tests for determining the con-
stitutionality of an exercise of jurisdiction center on the defendant's
contacts with a forum; and second, by historic tradition, that the
governmental unit denoted by the concept of "forum" is the state.
Even if the quoted passage is considered an endorsement of sov-
ereignty as an independent jurisdictional variable, it remains the
most extravagant sort of dictum. The Court in Hanson simply had no
occasion to consider whether a potential for sovereign injury could
warrant rejecting jurisdiction despite constitutionally adequate de-
fendant-forum contacts, for no established test of contacts was met.
Since the Court was of the view that plaintiffs claim concerned the
validity of a trust agreement executed in Delaware, rather than the
validity of a power of appointment exercised pursuant to the trust in
the forum state, Florida,5 8 it found that the cause of action "is not
one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum State." 59 Further, the nonresident defendant trust company
had not engaged in any regular or substantial course of business in
Florida apart from the incidental contacts related to the trust agree-
ment. Accordingly, in the first sentence after the passage on "territo-
rial limitation," the Court concludes: "We fail to find ...
[constitutionally adequate defendant-forum] contacts in the circum-
stances of this case."360
It may appear that the foregoing analysis trivializes the "conse-
quence" passage of Hanson. Yet the Court itself, in Shaffer v. Heitner,6 1
treats the Hanson sovereignty notion as a vacuous sweet nothing. Af-
ter identifying the "central concern" of the personal jurisdiction in-
quiry as the "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the
States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest," the Court adds the follow-
ing footnote:
58 357 U.S. at 252-53.
59 Id. at 251. See also the Court's statement that the "suit cannot be said to be one to
enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida." Id. at
252.
60 Id. at 251.
61 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
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Nothing in Hanson .. . is to the contrary. The Hanson Court's
statement that restrictions on state jurisdiction "are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States,".
simpl'y makes the point that the States are defined by their geographical terni-
togr. After making this point, the Court in Hanson determined that
the defendant. . . had not committed any acts sufficiently connected
to the State to justify jurisdiction under the International Shoe
standard. 62
In its time the Hanson invocation of sovereignty was surely thought to
stand for more than the revelation that "the States are defined by
their geographical territory. '63
B. World-Wide: Short-Lived Revival
The sovereignty concept gained new life when it was disinterred,
however briefly, in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.6 Paraphrasing
Hanson, Justice White wrote for the court: "[W]e have never ac-
cepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of inter-
state federalism embodied in the Constitution. 6 5 He then argued
that the sovereign power of each state to try causes in its courts im-
plies "a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limi-
tation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. '66 By quotation to
International Shoe, the Court reminded us that the reasonableness of
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be "assessed 'in the
context of our federal system of government,'" and that "the Due
Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the 'orderly admin-
istration of the laws.' "67 Justice White concluded with an expanded
formulation of sovereignty that constitutes a key feature of the World-
Wide opinion:
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, [326 U.S.] at 319.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the contro-
62 Id at 204 n.20 (emphasis added).
63 Kurland, supra note 21, at 621, 623.
64 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
65 Id at 293.
66 Id
67 Id. at 293-94.
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versy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate feder-
alism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment. Hanson v. Denkla, [357 U.S.] at 251, 254.68
Arguably the Court did not intend these pronouncements to say
anything more about sovereignty than the Hanson "consequence of"
statement, which Shafer had since consigned to seeming oblivion.
When the Court suggested that "interstate federalism" might oust a
forum of jurisdiction even if the defendant would "suffer minimal or
no inconvenience," the Court was not necessarily saying that inter-
state federalism would oust the forum of jurisdiction over a defend-
ant whose forum contacts satisfied the standards of International Shoe.
After all, even Hanson's disapproval was limited to jurisdiction based
solely on convenience; it cast no aspersions on jurisdiction supported
by constitutionally sufficient forum contacts. And World- Wide is
clearly in accord on the critical importance of contacts. As the Court
stated immediately before the "even if" sentence, what due process
forbids is the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks fo-
rum "contacts, ties or relations," 69 not an exercise of jurisdiction that
is to some degree inconvenient. 70
But this interpretation-that World- Wide simply restated Hanson
on sovereignty-is ultimately not persuasive. It is doubtful that, ab-
sent adequate contacts, the Court would have even considered up-
holding jurisdiction just because a forum happened to be convenient
to the defendant. 71 The Court had twice recently reaffirmed that
personal jurisdiction turns on contacts, not convenience. 72 Indeed, in
the preceding sentence in World- Wide, the Court stresses that "con-
tacts" are the indispensable prerequisites of jurisdiction. 73 In any
event, it strains credulity to hypothesize that the Court would in-
dulge in its sweeping statements about interstate federalism simply to
provide a rule of decision for the rare case where a nonresident de-
fendant would suffer no or only de minimis inconvenience by being
68 Id at 294 (emphasis added).
69 Id.
70 Admittedly, there is some slight support for a contrary position elsewhere in World-
Wide. The Court refers to the goal of the Internalional Shoe contacts tests as guaranteeing
against "inconvenient litigation" or protecting defendants "against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum." Id. at 292.
71 See Texas/Arkansas hypothetical discussed at R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 513 (2d ed. 1975); New York/New Jersey hypothetical discussed at Lewis,
supra note 15, at 821-22 n.306 and at Posnak, supra note 17, at 780.
72 Kutho, 436 U.S. at 100-01; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204, 209.
73 444 U.S. at 294.
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forced to litigate in the plaintiffs forum of choice. 74
A far more likely interpretation of the "even if" sentence,
viewed either in isolation or in contrast to the sentence immediately
preceding, is that the Court really did see state sovereignty as an in-
dependent concern of jurisdictional due process. "Independent" in
this sense means that if the demands of "sovereignty" would be dis-
served by an exercise of jurisdiction, then jurisdiction should be de-
clined notwithstanding satisfaction of a contacts test or other
measure of the forum's fairness to the parties. This interpretation is
supported by the Court's preface to the subject earlier in the World-
Wide opinion:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that States, through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system. 75
In other words, under the most plausible reading of the World-
Wide opinion, the Supreme Court not only resubscribed to but am-
plified on the sovereignty concept it had trivialized in Shaffer only
three years before. It taught that, in unspecified circumstances and
to an unstated degree, due process in the context of personal jurisdic-
tion is concerned with something more than preventing unfair depri-
vations of property. The Court evoked a doctrine which would
justify declining jurisdiction even when upholding jurisdiction would
fully satisfy the tests of fairness to the parties that have evolved obe-
diently to International Shoe.
World-Wide's ostensible reliance on International Shoe as support
for this position is forced, to say the least. In context, Justice Stone
actually equated the "fair and orderly administration of the laws"
.not with state sovereignty, but with the due process imperative of
protecting persons from having to mount defenses in distant forums
under unfair circumstances. To make the phrase serve for sover-
eignty, Justice White subjected it to mitosis. He transmuted the "fair
and orderly administration of the laws" into "fairness" and the "or-
derly administration of the laws." 76 As a result, the "orderly admin-
74 Professor Posnak concludes that under World-Wide a defendant having no contacts
with the plaintiff's forum of choice cannot be forced to litigate there, even if that forum is
more convenient for the defendant than any with which he has contacts. Posnak, supra note
17, at 780.
75 444 U.S. at 291-92 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 294.
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istration of the laws" becomes a separate goal of jurisdictional due
process, distinct from fairness to the defendant. Consequently, a con-
cept that was originally unitary, and almost undoubtedly concerned
in its entirety with individual rights, was split in two. World-Wide's
reliance on Hanson to buttress these conclusions about sovereignty is
especially astonishing, since the Court entirely overlooked Shafer's
abrupt dismissal of the Hanson formulation only three years earlier.
Ironically, in the decisions before World- Wide but after Hanson,
the Court had placed a higher value on protecting defendants than
on furthering the interests of plaintiffs or forum states. In Shaffer, for
example, the Court suggested that even a strong, legislatively articu-
lated forum state interest could not justify jurisdiction unless the fo-
rum were "fair" to the defendant, 77 with fairness to be measured by
the "ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation. '78 Simi-
larly, California's acknowledged interest in asserting jurisdiction in
Kulko v. Superior Court was held insufficient to make that forum consti-
tutionally fair.79 The Court commented in Kulko that "[w]hile the
interests of the forum State. . .are, of course, to be considered. ..,
an essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature'
of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to
require him to conduct his defense in that State."80 In World-Wide
itself, the Court treated the "burden on the defendant" as the "pri-
mary concern" of due process, in light of which "other relevant fac-
tors, including the forum State's interest" should merely be
"considered." 8
'
In Rush v. Savchuk,82 decided the same day as World-Wide, the
Court observed that a "variety of factors"-including a forum state's
interest in asserting jurisdiction-become "relevant" to the jurisdic-
tional determination only if the defendant has the requisite "judi-
cially cognizable ties with a State. '83 The Court emphasized that the
"judicially cognizable ties" in question are, in Shafer's terms, those
"among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. '8 4 Most im-
77 433 U.S. at 215.
78 Id. at 209.
79 436 U.S. at 100.
80 Id. at 92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81 444 U.S. at 292. The Court classified as additional subordinate jurisdictional factors
"the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." Id.
82 444 U.S. at 320.
83 Id. at 332.
84 Id. at 327.
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portantly, the Court stressed that the "[s]tate's interests in providing
a forum for its residents and in regulating the activities of insurance
companies. .. [may not be] substituted for its contacts with the de-
fendant and the cause of action. '8 5
The Court in World- Wide should at least have reckoned with this
steadily diminishing reliance on the forum state interest factor before
positing another governmental interest factor, state sovereignty, as
critical to personal jurisdiction. 6 Eventually this realization dawned
on the Court when it treated the "fair and orderly administration of
the laws" component of due process as just another emblem of fair-
ness to defendants: "The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'or-
derly administration of the laws,'. . . gives a degree of predictability
to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that con-
duct will and will not render them liable to suit."18 7 Thus some
commentators have concluded that World-Wide's actual measure of
sovereign power-which insists that a defendant's claim-related fo-
rum contact be not only purposeful but also, in some non-collateral
way, beneficial-aims more at protecting the defendant than at as-
sessing the relative interests of two or more states in adjudicating a
dispute.88
Furthermore, a discussion of state sovereignty was as unneces-
sary to the decision in World-Wide as it was in Hanson. The Court
twice asserted, in the most emphatic, if overstated, 89 terms, that there
was a "total absence" of "those affiliating circumstances9° that are a
85 Id. at 332.
86 For a discussion of the decline of forum state interest, see Lewis, supra note 15, at 796-
806.
87 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
88 Jay, 'Minimum Conmact"as a Uniftd Theo, ofjurrdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV.
429, 474 (1981); Lewis, supra note 15, at 803-04 & n.190; Whitten, supra note 21, at 842-43.
89 The World-Wide Court acknowledged that the defendant New York automobile re-
tailer and regional distributor did have at least one indirect contact with the Oklahoma fo-
rum: a car distributed by the distributor and sold by the retailer in New York was driven to
Oklahoma, where its occupants suffered personal injury when the car allegedly malfunc-
tioned because of a product defect. 444 U.S. at 295. The Court also acknowledged the possi-
bility, not proven of record, that the moving defendants "earn[ed] substantial revenue from
goods used in Oklahoma." Id. at 298. The Court decided, however, that any financial bene-
fits accruing to the defendants from the use in Oklahoma of the cars they distributed or sold
in New York stemmed from a "collateral relation" to the forum and thus did not represent a
"constitutionally cognizable contact with that State." Id. at 299. It is thus more accurate to
say that in World- Wide there was an "apparent paucity of contacts," rather than a complete
absence of contacts, between the moving defendants and Oklahoma. Id. at 289.
90 "Affiliating circumstances" was apparently a throwback to the use of those words in
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246. There they were used to refer to defendant-forum contacts sufficient
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necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction." 9' In
the Court's opinion, the World- Wide defendants who objected to ju-
risdiction had "no contacts, ties, or relations" with the forum state. 92
Accordingly, the Court simply had no occasion to consider whether
jurisdiction should have been declined for reasons of state sover-
eignty, since, as the Court simultaneously asserted in Rush, a non-
contacts factor like sovereignty becomes relevant only if the requisite
contacts are present.9 3
Put bluntly, the neo-sovereign utterances of the Court since Inter-
national Shoe enjoy scant standing in precedent, amount to little more
than fanciful obiter dicta on facts that fell short of satisfying party-
fairness standards, and make no discernible decisional difference.
Nevertheless, the insistent, highly specific iteration of the concept in
World-Wide commands our attention and compels us to try to come
to grips with what may be there.
One scholarly conclusion is that World-Wide
subtly but emphatically transformed Pennoyer's concern for state
sovereignty into a far broader concept. After Woodson, "state sover-
eignty" is no longer a self-contained quality designed simply to pre-
serve the dignity of the individual state. Rather it has been recast
as an essential element of interstate federalism-a relationship pre-
served only when "the states, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sover-
eigns in a federal system." 94
Yet even this positive view admits that "the Court gives only the
vaguest idea" of what its emphasis on interstate federalism "will
mean in concrete application." 95
Not the least of the practical problems with applying the "inter-
state federalism" concept is that of assigning weights to the several
state interests the concept appears to embrace. The interests of the
forum state-interests themselves elusive of precise quantifica-
tion 96-must presumably be weighed against the interests of other
sovereign states in vindicating their own substantive policies or af-
fording local litigants a forum. The Court provided no criteria to
to enable the forum fairly to enter a personal judgment. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
91 444 U.S. at 295.
92 Id. at 299.
93 444 U.S. at 332.
94 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 75 (footnotes omitted).
95 Id.
96 For a discussion of the difficulties of defining and weighing forum state interests, see
Lewis, supra note 15, at 835-49.
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identify competing sovereigns' legitimate interests, to weigh them ap-
propriately, or to resolve the resulting conflicts. It offers no clue as to
how strongly sovereignty concerns must tilt against the forum's juris-
diction in order to overcome the factors that demonstrate its fairness
to the parties. We are told only that the due process clause, acting as
an instrument of "interstate federalism," may divest a fair forum of
jurisdiction "sometimes."97
In fact, World-Wide suggests that two of the components of "in-
terstate federalism" may already be accounted for under the Interna-
tional Shoe standards of fairness to the parties. However illogically,9
the Court treats the "interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies" and the "shared inter-
est of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies" as factors in ascertaining the "burden on the defendant." 99
Yet these two government interests are also obvious ingredients of
any concept of interstate federalism.?°°
When we scratch the surface of phrases like "the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies" and the "shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies," we find little concern with
convenience to parties and witnesses or with efficiency. Would a
Court motivated by a desire to assist the parties in resolving their
controversies efficiently oust a fair forum of jurisdiction and relegate
the plaintiff to instituting suit elsewhere? Rather, the Court's evident
concern is with resolving controversies "correctly" by principled ap-
plication of rules on choice of law. Indeed, the very phrase "inter-
state system" used in World-Wide' 01  may be traced to the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.10 2 World-Wide's resort to
disguised choice-of-law considerations to resolve a personal jurisdic-
tion dispute is also consistent with the dictum in Kulko which counte-
nanced a forum's assuming jurisdiction to ensure application of its
own law and thereby advance its own substantive policies. 10 3 Of
course, the reason a potential forum lacks confidence about the law
that an alternative forum may apply is that to date the Court has
steadfastly declined to impose meaningful constitutional restrictions
97 444 U.S. at 294.
98 See Lewis, supra note 15, at 802-03.
99 444 U.S. at 292.
100 See Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 74 & n.75.
101 444 U.S. at 294.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 caveat a (1971).
103 436 U.S. at 98.
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on choice of law in cases where that issue has been raised directly. 10 4
By conjuring up federalism in its personal jurisdiction decisions, per-
haps the Court is subconsciously assuaging a conscience tinged with
guilt over its neglect of legitimate sovereign interests in the choice-of-
law arena, where those interests should receive top billing but have
not.
C. Insurance Corp. of Ireland: Swit? Second Death
After Shaffer's cavalier dismissal of the Hanson sovereignty dic-
tum, it is scarcely surprising that the World-Wide sovereignty dictum
would meet a similar fate. Nevertheless, when parents murder a two-
year child--or, more cruelly, simply belittle it-we may fairly won-
der why they conceived it in the first place.
Similar wonderment attends the Supreme Court's quiet killing
of "interstate federalism" in Ireland. The form of dismissal, a foot-
note, 10 5 is faithful to that used in Shafer; Shafer and Ireland differ only
in their techniques of denigration. Shafer dismissed Hanson's sover-
eignty excursion as a truism. Ireland disposed of World-Wide's more
elaborate description of interstate federalism by draining it of any
operative content different from the fairness due defendants.
Ireland was an action filed in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania by a Delaware corporation,
"CBG," to recover under an insurance policy covering the operations
of its bauxite mines in the Republic of Guinea. Among the defend-
ants were twenty-one insurance companies, based outside the United
States, which had undertaken to provide excess insurance for the sec-
ond ten million dollars of potential losses resulting from business in-
terruptions in CBG's Guinea operation. These "excess insurer"
defendants had undertaken that liability by initialing a "placing
slip" in London, England.10 6
The excess insurers moved for summary judgment on the
ground that they were not amenable to personal jurisdiction in Penn-
sylvania.10 7 CBG attempted to develop evidence through discovery
about the excess insurers' contacts with Pennsylvania, 08 and the dis-
trict court ultimately ordered the insurers to produce copies of their
policies which had been "delivered in. . .Pennsylvania. . .or cov-
104 See text accompanying notes 204, 213-16 infla.
105 Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2049,
2104 n.10 (1982).
106 Id. at 2101.
107 Id. at 2102.
108 Id. at 2102-03.
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ered a risk located in. . .Pennsylvania."1 9 After failing to meet the
court-ordered deadline, the insurers eventually offered to make their
records available for CBG's inspection in London, in lieu of produc-
ing them in Pennsylvania. Responding to CBG's motion to compel,
the district court warned the defendants that if they failed to produce
the requested policies in Pennsylvania within an additional sixty
days, it would "assume, under rule of Civil Procedure 37B, subsec-
tion 2(A), that there is jurisdiction."' 10 The court qualified this order
by adding that it would not indulge that assumption if the defend-
ants themselves "produce[d] statistics and other information . ..
that would indicate otherwise."' 1
About four months later, after concluding that the requested
material had not been timely produced, the district court ruled that
the excess insurers were, "for the purpose of this litigation," subject to
personal jurisdiction "because of their business contacts with Penn-
sylvania.""12 The court offered three grounds to support this ruling.
The first was that jurisdiction should be found through the operation
of the rule 37(b) (2) (A) sanction, resulting in the fictitious finding that
the defendants had business contacts with Pennsylvania sufficient to.
support jurisdiction."X3 Second, the court found that the record actu-
ally showed "sufficient business contacts with Pennsylvania to fall
within the Pennsylvania long-arm statute."'" 14 The court did not ex-
plain how, even if the record showed contacts sufficient to satisfy the
forum's long-arm statute, those contacts would also satisfy due pro-
cess." 5 Third, the court found that the excess insurers, by adopting
109 Id. at 2102.
110 Id. Among other available sanctions that FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) authorizes for a
failure to comply with discovery orders is: "An order that the matters regarding which the
order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order."
111 102 S. Ct. at 2103.
112 Id.
113 The district court did not explain if these contacts sufficed for jurisdiction under the
Pennsylvania long-arm statute, the due process clause, or both. FED. R. Ciy. P. 4(e) incorpo-
rates by reference in federal diversity cases the applicable long-arm statute of the forum state.
114 102 S. Ct. at 2103.
115 In Intenational Shoe, McGee, Shaffer, Kulko, World- Wide, and Rush, it was clear that the
forum's long-arm statute, at least as interpreted by its courts, reached far enough to subject a
nonresident defendant to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the question remained whether an exer-
cise ofjurisdiction under such a statute would satisfy due process. The converse is also true.
That an exercise ofjurisdiction may satisfy due process does not answer the question whether
the forum state wishes to assert it, and, in general, a state's failure to provide for long-arm
jurisdiction is not a denial of due process. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948);
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922).
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the terms of the primary insurer's "Pennsylvania insurance contract"
with CBG, had "implicitly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
court."1 1 6 In other words, the court found jurisdiction based on a
supposed implied consent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed the jurisdiction holding, "relying entirely upon the validity of
the sanction."" 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict between this decision and a Fifth Circuit ruling that the facts
concerning forum contacts may not be found fictitiously as a sanc-
tion for failure to make discovery, but must "appear from the record
independently of the sanction."" 8 The grant of the certiorari peti-
tion' 19 was limited to "the question of the validity of the Rule
37(b) (2) sanction."' 20 The Supreme Court framed the question thus
posed: "May a District Court, as a sanction for failure to comply
with a discovery order directed at establishing jurisdictional facts,
proceed on the basis that personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant
party has been established?"' 2 '
The Court initially likened the rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction to a
finding of waiver of the jurisdictional objection, analogous to the
waiver resulting from a failure to timely object to personal jurisdic-
tion in the defendant's answer or first motion.' 22 Later, however, the
Court more accurately observed that the district court "simply
placed the burden of proof upon. . .[defendant] on the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction."' 23 This observation recognized that the burden is
ordinarily on the plaintiff, once personal jurisdiction is challenged, to
produce evidence of the defendant's forum contacts on which the
personal jurisdiction finding usually rests. 24 It also recognized that
the district court, in threatening to impose the rule 37 sanction, of-
fered defendants the opportunity to produce evidence that they lacked
116 102 S. Ct. at 2103.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 2103 & n.8. The courts of appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits had
agreed with the Third Circuit that a determination upholding personal jurisdiction might be
predicated on a discovery sanction. Id. at 2103 n.8.
119 The petition granted was actually a cross-petition filed by defendant excess insurers in
response to a petition filed by CBG challenging the court of appeals' dismissal of the com-
plaint with respect to three other excess insurers. 102 S. Ct. at 2101 nn.1 & 3.
120 Id. at 2101 n.l.
121 Id. at 2101.
122 Id at 2105-06. The combined effect of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) and 12(g) is to impose
a waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense if it is not timely raised in the answer or if it is
omitted from a motion made before answer.
123 102 S. Ct. at 2107.
124 Id. at 2105.
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the constitutionally requisite contacts with Pennsylvania. The real
effect of the sanction, then, was twofold: to alter the normal burden
of producing evidence about jurisdictional facts, by placing it on de-
fendants; and to declare a conditional waiver by defendants of their
jurisdictional objection if they failed to discharge that burden. In
Ireland, the conditional waiver became absolute when the defendants
declined the proffered opportunity.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment,
thereby upholding jurisdiction in a case where, as the Court ac-
knowledged, the record itself did not demonstrate that the moving
defendants had claim-related or non-claim-related forum contacts of
the kind that International Shoe and its progeny had considered indis-
pensable to personal jurisdiction. Moreover, although the action
happened to lie in a federal court, the authors of both the majority
and concurring opinions agreed that the Court's decision carried
identical constitutional consequences for the personal jurisdiction re-
quirements governing state courts. 125 The concurring justice, Justice
Powell, citing the Court's state-court jurisdictional decisions from In-
ternational Shoe through World-Wide, complained that "minimum con-
tacts" between defendants and forum states must appear of record.
By
finding that the establishment of minimum contacts is not a prereq-
uisite to the exercise of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 37, the Court may be understood as finding that
"minimum contacts" no longer is a constitutional requirement for
the exercise by a state court of personal jurisdiction over an uncon-
senting defendant. 126
Justice Powell then lamented that the decision inevitably also
signals the death of jurisdictional sovereignty. He cited World- Wide
and Hanson for the proposition that the International Shoe framework
"had linked minimum contacts and fair play asjointy defining the
'sovereign' limits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction over un-
consenting defendants." 127 Justice Powell concluded:
The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a foot-
note. . . [n. 10] [b]ut it does not address the implications of its ac-
tion. By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as
a "sovereign" limitation on the power of States. . .the court today
effects a potentially substantial change of law. For the first time it
defines personal jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions
125 Id. at 2104-05; id. at 2109-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 2110 (Powell, J., concurring).
127 Id.
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of fair play.1 28
Justice Powell's remarks fairly reflect the gist of the majority's
holding and supporting rationale. The Court started with the propo-
sition that the due process clause is the only source of constitutional
limitations on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. 129 Second,
and by explicit contrast to the requirements of subject matter juris-
diction, 130 the Court stated that personal jurisdiction requirements
recognize and protect "an individual liberty interest." Due process
in the personal jurisdiction setting, therefore, "represents a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty."' 131 In turn, ':[b]ecause the requirement of per-
sonal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like
other such rights, be waived."' 32 Somewhat circularly, the Court ar-
gued that these characteristics of the personal jurisdiction defense-
its susceptibility to waiver, consent, or estoppel--"portray it for what
it is: a legal right protecting the individual."'' 33 Reviewing a variety
of situations in which, both before and after International Shoe, the
Court had upheld jurisdiction based on theories of waiver or express
or implied consent, the court concluded: "The actions of the defend-
ant may amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
whether voluntary or not."'134
What, then, of sovereignty? Whenever jurisdiction is exercised
without proof of defendant-forum contacts on the record, there will
necessarily also be no evidence that the defendant, through his activi-
ties, has brought himself within the realm of the State's sovereign
power. The humiliating task of explaining the sovereignty concept
so recently elaborated in World- Wide, in the face of its apparent
abandonment in Ireland, fell to Justice White, World-Wide's author.
He addressed the sovereignty concept most explicitly in the footnote
of which Justice Powell principally complained:
It is true that we have stated [in World Wide] that the require-
ment of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an
128 Id. (footnotes omitted).
129 Id. at 2104 n.10.
130 This contrast between the rules that allow waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense
(E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972); National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890)) and those
that preserve the subject matter jurisdiction defense (E.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126 (1804)) had been foreshadowed in the literature. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 812.
131 102 S. Ct. at 2104.





element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-
vis other states. . . . Contrary to the suggestion of Justice POW-
ELL, our holding today does not alter the requirement that there
be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defendant and
the forum state. Rather, our holding deals with how the facts
needed to show those "minimum contacts" can be established when
a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered discovery. The re-
striction on state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.,
however, must be seen as ultimately afunction of the individual libery interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept
operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it
would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Indi-
vidual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although
the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may
otherwise be protected.' 35
It is hard to disagree with Justice Powell that this footnote cuts
sovereignty completely adrift. The Court's statement that World-
Wide's restriction on state sovereign power "must be seen as ulti-
mately a function of the liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause" effectively equates the nonequatable. If sovereignty really
were a function of the individual interests of civil litigants, why
would sovereignty concerns ever oust a fair forum of jurisdiction, as
World- Wide had warned they might? By upholding jurisdiction even
in the absence of forum contacts, Ireland demonstrates that the sover-
eignty concept does not independently restrict personal jurisdiction.
The Court acknowledged as much when it commented that "if' fed-
eralism independently limited personal jurisdiction, waiver of juris-
dictional objections-held constitutional in Ireland-would be
impossible, since individuals may not waive sovereign objections.
This repudiation of sovereignty is striking in style as well as in
substance. By declaring the due process clause to be the only source
of constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction, and noting that
the clause "itself makes no mention of federalism concerns," the
Court cast the gravest doubt on Justice White's observation in World-
Wide that sovereignty limitations on state judicial jurisdiction are
"express or implicit in the original scheme of the Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment."'136 The Ireland recognition that restric-
tions on state sovereign power really protect an individual liberty in-
135 Id. at 2104-05 n.10 (emphasis added) (footnotes and quotation from World-Wide
omitted).
136 444 U.S. at 293.
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terest is reminiscent of World- Wide's ultimate concession that the
"orderly administration of the laws" relates to the ability of the de-
fendant to structure his own activities to avoid inconvenient suit. 37
The "ultimately a function of" language in Ireland also ironically
echoes the assertion in Hanson that jurisdictional restrictions are a
"consequence of" state territorial limitations. In what sense are juris-
dictional restrictions "a consequence of" limitations on state territo-
ries and, at the same time, "ultimately a function of" the liberty
interest of individuals?
The conclusion that the Court has scotched sovereignty alto-
gether is fortified by considering how far it reached to decide that
issue. The majority might have joined Justice Powell in finding that
plaintiff had made a "prima facie showing of minimum contacts"
sufficient to warrant the entry of discovery orders and the consequent
rule 37 sanction. Under that approach the majority would have pre-
served at least a vestige of the sovereignty theory by refusing to up-
hold jurisdiction absent some evidence of defendant-forum contacts.
Instead, the majority followed the Third Circuit's lead, upholding
jurisdiction based on a presumption that defendants' "refusal to pro-
duce evidence material to the administration of due process was but
an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense."1 38 As a
result, the facts about minimum contacts were "found," if at all,
through a fictitious admission of jurisdiction attributed to the de-
fendants. The Court considered this "legal presumption" tanta-
mount to "the finding of a constructive waiver."' 39 On this approach
jurisdiction was upheld without a true finding of any of the forum
contacts that the sovereignty theory demands. Thus Justice Powell
commented, "Fair resolution of this case does not require the Court's
broad holding [on sovereignty],"' 4 pointing out that "this rationale
for decision was neither argued nor briefed by the parties."' 4'
But the majority's decision to rest its ruling entirely on the the-
ory of constructive waiver, rather than on the trial court's apparently
erroneous 42 determination that defendants had extensive forum con-
137 See discussion of World- Wide at text accompanying note 87 supra.
138 102 S. Ct. at 2106 (citing Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351
(1909)).
139 102 S. Ct. at 2106.
140 Id. at 2108.
141 Id. at 2110.
142 As Judge Gibbons observed in his partial dissent from the decision of the Third Cir-
cuit, the district judge, as a sanction for noncompliance with discovery orders, deemed it
established that the excess insurer defendants had engaged in substantial, continuous activity
within Pennsylvania. This conclusion was apparently thought necessary to justify an asser-
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tacts, is squarely in accord with the Court's most recent pronounce-
ments on jurisdictional fact-finding. In World-Wide, the Court
frowned on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's inference that the de-
fendants must have derived substantial revenue from Oklahoma be-
cause one of the automobiles they had distributed or sold in New
York was ultimately used there. 43 Although the Court reluctantly
respected that inference on the state-law question of how to interpret
Oklahoma's long-arm statute, 44 it demurred when it came to the
Constitution, rejecting the notion that such a one-time "use" contact
reaped a benefit for defendants directly or substantially enough to
satisfy due process. 45 In brief, the Court desired the facts about fo-
rum contacts to appear of record, at least where it was fair to expect
the plaintiff to produce them.
Actually, the Ireland defendants did not advertently or volunta-
rily waive their jurisdictional defense any more than, so far as the
record revealed, they were subject to jurisdiction under the usual
contacts test. "Waiver" was declared as a sanction for unjustified re-
fusal to provide discovery about jurisdictional facts. Thus the real
question concerns the nature and gravity of a defendant's conduct
that will warrant a court, consistent with due process, to declare a
forfeiture of the personal jurisdiction defense. As the Court noted,
the forfeitures imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for
failure to timely contest personal jurisdiction have not been thought
offensive to due process. For the Ireland majority, due process protec-
tions are similarly not transgressed by a rule 37 sanction that defeats
the personal jurisdiction defense of a defendant who interposes it
timely but prevents it from being fairly decided. In a sense such a
defendant is very much like the first, in that he, too, fails to press the
defense in a manner conducive to its efficient, expeditious resolution.
Further, the property impaired by the personal jurisdiction sanction
obviously pales next to the property put at risk by a full default judg-
ment, and entry of a default judgement as a discovery sanction had
earlier passed constitutional muster in a decision the Supreme Court
tion of "general" jurisdiction as to a claim that arose outside the forum. To Judge Gibbons, it
seemed very clear that the trial court's "extensive and pervasive" presumed jurisdictional
facts were contrary to the reality of the defendants' contacts with Pennsylvania. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 889, 890 (3d Cir.
1981). Ste also Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Discove.y Sanctions, 27 ViLL. L. REv. 744,
756 (1982).
143 444 U.S. at 298.
144 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701-03(a)(4) (1971).
145 444 U.S. at 298-99.
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reaffirmed in Ireland. 146
In sum, interstate federalism no longer operates, if it ever did, as
an independent restriction on a state court's sovereign power. This
decision may be defended on pragmatic as well as theoretical
grounds. If sovereignty in the World- Wide sense were an independent
prerequisite to personal jurisdiction, long-standing rationales for up-
holding jurisdiction based on consent, waiver, or estoppel would be
of doubtful validity. The Court is clearly convinced, however, that
exercises of jurisdiction predicated on express contractual consent, 147
constructive consent by plaintiffs to submit to counterclaims, 148 or
defendants' waivers of the jurisdictional objection at the onset of liti-
gation, 49 are not only useful but fully consistent with fair play to the
parties, and, therefore, constitutional under International Shoe. This
conclusion holds true even though jurisdiction in such cases will gen-
erally not be based on a demonstration of the ordinarily required
forum contacts and will, accordingly, lack the traditional foundation
for the exercise of state sovereign power.
However sound its conclusion, Ireland represents such an abrupt
about face from World- Wide that, despite the distance the Court went
to uphold jurisdiction without reference to contacts, it is natural to
doubt whether the decision represents sovereignty's definitive demise.
Yet the arguments that would limit the significance of Ireland to its
facts will not withstand analysis. It might be supposed, for instance,
that the Court's willingness to dispense with evidence of the defend-
ant's forum contacts was influenced by its desire to promote adher-
ence to the discovery processes of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. But it is clear from World- Wide that the source of sover-
eignty interests lies somewhere in the federal constitution. It is un-
likely that a constitutional imperative would be shelved in favor of
rules of procedure.
An allied argument is that the Court relaxed its usual insistence
on a factual predicate for the exercise of sovereign power out of spe-
cial concern for the predicament of the Ireland plaintiff. It was, after
all, the plaintiff who was prevented by the excess insurers' recalci-
146 See the Court's approving discussion of Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S.
322 (1909), at 102 S. Ct. 2106-07.
147 See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 495 (1956) (discussed with
approval in Ireland, 102 S. Ct. at 2105).
148 See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1939) (also discussed with approval in Ireland, 102
S. Ct. at 2105).
149 The Court cited the waiver created by FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) resulting from the de-
fendant's failure to timely object to personal jurisdiction. 102 S. Ct. at 2105.
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trance from producing evidence of the ordinarily required contacts.
This argument overlooks the fact that the World-Wide sovereignty
concept always overrides the interests of plaintiffs. In World-Wide the
Court said that even if the forum were convenient to the defendant,
sovereignty concerns might oust the forum of jurisdiction. That re-
sult would clearly be at the plaintiffs expense rather than the
defendant's.
Ireland has thus probably dispatched interstate sovereignty as a
jurisdictional determinant as completely as Rush had dispatched fo-
rum state interest two years before. Rush instructed that a forum
state's interest in asserting jurisdiction may not substitute for the de-
fendant-forum contacts described by International Shoe. Ireland in-
structs that International Shoe fairness standards may occasionally be
met even where the record is devoid of evidence of adequate forum
contacts. In the process, Ireland also necessarily recognizes that a
nexus between sovereign and defendant is not an invariable requisite
of jurisdiction, and hence that a forum which is fair to the parties
should not be ousted of jurisdiction out of deference to the sover-
eignty of other states.
It remains to consider the lessons to be drawn from this some-
what shabby history of sovereignty, and to venture some thoughts
about its larger implications for personal jurisdiction theory.
IV. The Lessons of Abstract Jurisprudence and Larger
Implications for Personal Jurisdiction
A. Lessons
The Court's sudden switches on sovereignty from Shafer to
World-Wide to Ireland spanned a period of only five years. The erratic
course of decision suggests that what went awry was fairly fundamen-
tal. Two speculations will be offered here about the disarray in doc-
trine. First, the Court erred in resting personal jurisdiction decisions
on an abstract, assumed first principle of government like "sover-
eignty." Second, the Court strayed because, until Ireland, it repeat-
edly failed to apprehend that the sole proper concern of the due
process clause in the personal jurisdiction setting is with the interests
of individual litigants, and not with interests of state governments.
The personal jurisdiction brand of "sovereignty" lacks specific
constitutional roots, is vague in. the description of its concerns, and
has had negligible operative impact. As described by Justice White
in World-Wide, the doctrine rests on nothing more solid than features
postulated as "implicit" in our federal system. Perhaps as a result,
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the Court has been unable to articulate adequately the relevant in-
terests of individual forum states or of the "collective community"'1 50
of states which sovereignty seeks to serve. It has developed no rela-
tive ranking of the various state sovereign prerogatives that might be
invaded by the forum's assertion of jurisdiction. Still less has it sug-
gested how severe a threat of sovereign injury must be to require the
displacement of an otherwise fair forum. For example, in World- Wide
the interest of New York, the presumptive alternative forum, was at
most only equal to Oklahoma's interest in providing the arena for
resolving the controversy. 151 The Court did not explain how New
York's sovereignty would be undermined by a decision depriving its
already overburdened courts of the opportunity to decide whether
Arizona plaintiffs could recover for injuries allegedly sustained in
Oklahoma at the hands of four defendants, only two of whom were
shown to be based in New York.
From vagueness comes undue discretion. World-Wide's state sov-
ereignty concept is manipulable at will to justify denials of jurisdic-
tion without benefit of concrete standards. In this respect interstate
sovereignty shares many of the characteristics of the related govern-
mental interest doctrine that focuses more narrowly on the concerns
of forum states. In short, it is yet another unweighted personal juris-
diction fudge factor.
It is therefore somewhat baffling to read Justice Powell's com-
plaint in Ireland that the majority defines personal jurisdiction restric-
tions solely "by reference to abstract notions of fair play," rather
than also by reference to the even more abstract concerns of state
sovereignty. By and large, the Court has succeeded in giving con-
crete meaning to its concept of "fair play" to the parties, through
case-by-case elaboration of the standards of International Shoe. In par-
ticular, it has developed highly specific tests of forum contacts which
range at the extremes from a single, purposeful, and beneficial claim-
related contact to a series of regular, substantial and continuous but
non-claim-related contacts. These tests, in turn, are geared to the
somewhat more general, but still workable, overall fairness criteria of
foreseeability and benefit. 152 It is, rather, the Hanson and World- Wide
notion of state sovereignty that the Court has failed to endow with
specific content.
150 The term is Professor McDougal's. McDougal, supra note 28, at 15, 29.
151 Id. at 56.
152 For a discussion of the foreseeability and benefit rationales for these tests, see Lewis,
supra note 15, at 781-83.
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In the Court's partial defense, it should be said that resort to
assumed first premises of government-sovereignty and federalism
are signal examples-as tools of decision is in the mainstream of a
rich jurisprudential tradition. Unfortunately, in these other contexts
where the Court has principally relied on its abstract conception of
the role of sovereignty in a federal system, the resulting decisions
have likewise been ripe for overruling.
In the License Cases,153 for instance, Chief Justice Taney invoked
general principles of federal-state relations to sustain state regula-
tions of commerce, declaring them "valid unless they come in conflict
with a law of Congress." 154 Just four years later, though, Cooler v.
Board of Wardens t55 cast doubt on this suggestion in the License Cases
that only federal statutory law could overcome state commerce regu-
lations,156 and before long, in Leisy v. Hardin,157 the Court invalidated
an Iowa law prohibiting the sale of certain intoxicating liquors de-
spite the absence of any positive federal enactment to the contrary.
In doing so the Court acknowledged that the "authority of [the Li-
cense Cases] . . . must be regarded as having been distinctly over-
thrown."'' 58 Similarly, a preliminary decision which denied federal
authority to tax the salaries of state officials out of deference to the
"reserved rights of the States"' 159 was twice qualified' 60 before it was
153 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
154 Id. at 579.
155 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
156 The Court in Cooly upheld state regulations requiring the use of local pilots by foreign
and interstate ships, but, in dictum, disclosed a category of cases in which state regulation
would not be allowed, even in the absence of congressional action: "Whatever subjects of this
[commerce] power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan
of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress." 53 U.S. at 319.
157 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
158 Id at 118.
159 Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). The Court in Collector held that the
salaries of state court judges were immune from a national income tax. The exemption was
said to rest upon "necessary implication" from the concept of the "reserved rights of the
States, such as the right . . . to administer justice through the courts, and to employ all
necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of State government." Id. at 128 (quoting Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (11 Wall.) 533, 547 (1869)).
160 The Collector principle was first limited to preclude only "direct and substantial inter-
ference" with state functions. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387
(1937). Then, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1937), the Court upheld federal in-
come taxation of employees of the Port of New York Authority. The burden on the home
states of those employees was now termed "but a necessary incident to the co-existence within
the same organized government of the two taxing sovereigns, and hence is a burden the exist-
ence of which the Constitution presupposes." Id. at 424.
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ultimately overruled 61 upon more mature reflection by the Court
about the paramount interests of the national government.
An instructive contemporary illustration of the frailty of deci-
sions bottomed on a generalized concern for sovereignty is furnished
by the saga of National League of Cities v. Usey.162 There the Court,
overruling the recently decided Maryland v. Wirtz,163 reasoned that
federal wage and hour restrictions "interfere with the integral gov-
ernmental functions" of the states and would "significantly alter or
displace the states' abilities to structure employer-employee relation-
ships" in providing services "which the States have traditionally af-
forded their citizens." Such an exercise of congressional authority,
the Court said, "does not comport with the federal system of govern-
ment embodied in the Constitution."'
National League of Cities was then almost immediately distin-
guished in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 165 where the Court held that the Con-
stitution did not forbid applying the sex discrimination prohibitions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the State of Connecti-
cut. The Court did not deny that a federal ban on sex discrimination
in employment might "significantly alter or displace the States' abili-
ties to structure employer-employee relationships,"1 66 nor did it find
that the employees who enjoyed the protection of Title VII were en-
gaged in providing services other than those "which the States have
traditionally afforded their citizens."'1 67 Instead, the Court simply
stated that the eleventh amendment, which had been urged as a bar
to the recovery of damages in the action, "and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies. . . are necessarily limited by the en-
forcement provisions of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment,"' 168 one of
the constitutional sources of authority for the enactment of Title VII.
The Court purported to distinguish National League of Cities by ob-
serving that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provisions under
attack in that case were not enacted under the authority of the four-
161 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), flatly overruled Collector to
the extent that it had recognized an implied "constitutional immunity from income taxation
of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or state government or their instrumen-
talities." 306 U.S. at 486.
162 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
163 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
164 426 U.S. at 852.
165 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
166 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.
167 Id
168 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456.
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teenth amendment. 169 Still, since the FLSA must have been enacted
under the authority of some constitutional legislative grant, probably
the commerce clause, 170 one might have expected the Court to ex-
plain why authority flowing from the commerce clause does not limit
the principle of state sovereignty, while authority flowing from the
fourteenth amendment does.
Perhaps at least some of the inconsistency to this point was a
product of the Court's obscurity in National League of Cities concern-
ing the specific constitutional textual source of the underlying state
sovereignty limitation on congressional power.17 1 But in a decision
issued during the current term, Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Wyoming,' 72 the Court explicitly identified the tenth amend-
ment as the locus of a state's sovereignty-based objection to
enforcement of a cognate federal employement statute aimed against
age discrimination. 73 Further, the five-member majority treated the
commerce clause as the sole source of the countervailing federal au-
thority, expressly disclaiming reliance on section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 174 Nevertheless, although the basis on which Fitzpatrick
had distinguished National League of Cities was thus rendered unavail-
able, the Court once more refused to strike down federal employment
discrimination legislation, seizing on yet another way to distinguish
National League of Cities. The Court found the "degree" of federal in-
trusion on state functions worked by the age discrimination statute to
be "sufficiently less serious" than that created by the general wage
and hour legislation at issue in National League, and held, accordingly,
that it was "unnecessary" to condemn the age act. 175
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Powell cited footnote
ten of Ireland as an example of the Court's continuing respect for the
"significant sovereign powers" retained by the states. 176 The citation
is more than a little incongruous, since the overwhelming thrust of
that footnote (as Justice Powell himself bemoaned at length in his
concurring opinion in Ireland) was to deny state sovereignty any in-
dependent role in the personal jurisdictional determination, or, at the
169 Id at 452-53.
170 See National League ofCities, 426 U.S. at 836 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 115 (1941)).
171 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 308 n.9 (1978).
172 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. March 2, 1983).
173 The Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 621-643. (1976 & Supp. 1980).
174 51 U.S.L.W. at 4224.
175 Id at 4222-23.
176 Id at 4232 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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very least, to dilute drastically the World- Wide Volkswagen dictum to
the contrary.
Judges have sought refuge behind ill-defined first principles of
government almost routinely in interpreting the jurisdictional facet
of the due process clause, itself one of the murkiest constitutional
mandates. Interstate sovereignty has some notoriously amorphous
ancestors: the natural, international, and public law principles
which underpinned Pennoyer v. Neff; Pennoyer's own strict territorial
limitations, with their curiously nonterritorial exceptions; and Justice
Stone's breezy references in International Shoe to the "context of our
federal system of government" and the "fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws." The brief life of "interstate sovereignty," then, is
but a minor disharmony in a far grander discordant theme. Judges
seem addicted to ad hoc, abstract lawmaking when they dispense ju-
risdictional due process. Nowhere has that tendency been manifested
more persistently than in the doctrine of "forum state interest."
Both of the governmental interest doctrines, interstate sover-
eignty and forum state interest, are motivated by the Court's concern
with undeniably important interests of state government. But the
Court's preoccupation with those interests has led it to overlook their
irrelevance to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
When that motion is granted, the plaintiff may almost always start
over again in another forum. The motion usually determines no
rights on the merits and resolves no issues that implicate substantive
state policy. Had the Court heeded these limited litigation conse-
quences, it might have eliminated governmental interests from juris-
dictional analysis well before Ireland.
An even more salient cause of the misplaced respect paid to gov-
ernment interests in this context has been the Court's blindness to the
elementary proposition that the personal jurisdiction motion deter-
mines purely personal rights. In a noteworthy article, 177 Professor
Redish has argued that "there is nothing in either the language or
purposes of the due process clauses-both of which are rooted in the
protection of the individual from governmental oppression-to credit
a federalism theory of due process."' 171 Although there is no logical
"connection between the development of the doctrine of due process
and the limits imposed on personal jurisdiction based on federal-
ism,"'1 79 the Court nevertheless "infused vague concepts of interstate
177 Redish, supra note 21.




sovereignty into the due process clause. These limitations on state
authority are imposed in the name of the clause, regardless of
whether private parties-the ultimate beneficiaries of these protec-
tions-are in danger of suffering real injustice." 180
At least since International Shoe, jurisdictional due process has re-
volved around what the Court in Pennoyer termed the "personal
rights and obligations of parties" and the "protection and enforce-
ment of private rights."'"" For present purposes it is unnecessary to
debate whether these quotations from Pennoyer are sufficiently encom-
passing to support the contention that the "person" protected by due
process includes the civil plaintiff.32 It is enough to observe that the
"sole concern" of due process should be "the prevention of injustice
to the individual."18 3  Chief Justice Stone's expansive language
notwithstanding, the Court's actual approach in International Shoe was
to appraise the forum contacts of the defendant corporation in order
to ascertain whether its degree of benefit from forum activities, or its
expectancy of suit there, sufficed to make forum jurisdiction "fair."
Although the Court may also have been concerned with the State of
Washington as a plaintiff, it showed no similar solicitude for Wash-
ington as a forum state.
Ironically, the modern Court's lax concept of relevance-that is,
its emphasis on government interests to resolve an issue of individual
rights-appeared as early as Justice Black's concurring opinion in
International Shoe, the very case that should have rendered this side-
track obsolete. To Justice Black, the State of Washington had juris-
diction over the defendant corporation because of that State's
"power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue
corporations whose agents do business" there.184 So strongly did he
180 Id. at 1113-14.
181 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
182 There is some support for a "plaintiff's due process" position in the Supreme Court's
decisions. The use of the forum state interest doctrine to uphold jurisdiction in the nonresi-
dent motorist cases may be seen as promoting the plaintiff's interest in the enforcement of
private rights. The Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957),
took explicit account of convenience to the plaintiff, and in World- Wide the Court explicitly
recognizes the plaintiff's interest as a relevant factor. 444 U.S. at 292. The Court has recently
affirmed in a nonjurisdictional context that a state-created cause of action is a species of
"property" protected by due process from arbitrary deprivation by the state. Logan v. Zim-
merman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). But see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332
(1980) (condemning substitution of plaintiff's forum contacts for defendant's). See also
Brilmayer, How ContatIs Count: Due frocess Limitations on State Court Jurisdction, 1980 S. Cr.
REV. 77, 110; McDougal, supra note 28, at 9.
183 Redish, supra note 21, at 1143.
184 326 U.S. at 324 (Black,.J., concurring).
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believe that the legislative power could not be judicially conditioned
upon notions of fair play to the parties 85 that he would have dis-
missed the appeal in International Shoe as lacking in substance.18 6
Justice Black's reliance on forum state interest fundamentally
confuses state substantive power and judicial jurisdiction. 87 It is cer-
tainly true that a state's interest in upholding its legislative policies
against a substantive due process attack deserves great weight.1 88 By
force of the full faith and credit clause, the policies embedded in state
legislation should receive deference from any forum properly seized of
jurisdiction when those policies are drawn in question.1 89 But sub-
stantive state policy is not, or at least should not, 190 be in jeopardy on
the personal jurisdiction motion. The sole stakes at that stage of the
litigation are those of the parties in securing an advantageous forum
or resisting an unfair one.
Any doubt that individual rights predominate over state inter-
ests in personal jurisdiction decisions should have been put to rest by
the Court's opinions in Shafr, Kulko, and Rush. Shafr strongly sug-
gested that even an important, statutorily expressed forum interest in
hearing a dispute would be subordinate to the "central" relationship
"among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."1 91 Kulko char-
acterized the interests of the forum in that case as "important" and
"substantial," yet considered fairness to the defendant the "essential
185 Id. at 324-25.
186 Id. at 322.
187 This same confused conceptual line divided the Court in Pennayr. See Lewis, supra
note 15, at 784-85. Note in particular Justice Black's contention in International Shoe that
Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943), which had sustained state substantive
taxing legislation, was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in International Shoe. 326 U.S. at
323 (Black, J., concurring).
188 This is especially true when the entire citizenry is the intended beneficiary of legisla-
tive policies embodied in the statutory regulation. Invalidating a statute as an impermissible
forum regulation not only prevents implementation of these policies in the present action, but
also denies their application in future actions.
189 See Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well Curried L.wflar Approach, 34 MERCER L. REV. 731,
751-52 (1983).
190 Personal jurisdiction motions govern only the place where an action may be brought.
In this situation, unlike those concerning questions of what law applies, the state has no legiti-
mate interest unless it happens to be a party to the litigation, in which case its interest is not
that of a sovereign. A legal "realist" would probably counter that in practice, once a forum
asserts jurisdiction, it will be substantially free to pick and choose among the laws of all the
states that have any connection, however remote, to a litigation with interstate elements. See
text accompanying notes 204, 213-16 infra. The short answer is that two wrongs not only fail
to right the problems with the Supreme Court's hands-off approach to choice of law, but
create the additional problem of encouraging jurisdictional decisions that may be unfair to
the parties. See text accompanying notes 211 and 205-07 infra.
191 433 U.S. at 204.
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criterion in all cases.' 92 Rush explicitly condemned any shift of fo-
cus from the forum contacts of the defendant to the interests of the
forum state (or for that matter, the plaintiff)., 93
In summary, although the government interest doctrines have
enjoyed a remarkable rhetorical vitality in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions since International Shoe, they have made no decisional differ-
ence.' 94 They have not caused the Court to deny jurisdiction which
should otherwise have been upheld under fairness standards, or to
uphold jurisdiction when, by those standards, it should have been
denied.'95 Building on the Court's de facto rejection of the govern-
ment interest factors, a growing body of scholarly opinion antici-
pated the several critical conclusions announced in Ireland that
ordain the death of sovereignty. These conclusions are, in the com-
mentators' words: First, that the due process clause is "the only con-
stitutional limitation on the reach of state judicial jurisdiction"; 96
second, that in the personal jurisdiction context "the protections of
the due process clause should accrue to private parties alone"; 197 and
third, consequently, that "the due process analysis of personal juris-
diction should be redefined to focus exclusively on the interests of the
[parties]."' 198
Nothing said here is intended to detract from the importance of
the government interests sought to be advanced by the doctrines of
forum state interest and state sovereignty. To the contrary, such in-
192 436 U.S. at 98, 100, 92.
193 444 U.S. at 332. Shifting the analysis from a defendant's due process rights to the
plaintiff's interest in a convenient forum is "forbidden by International Shoe and its prog-
eny." I
194 In view of these decisions, it is most difficult to agree that, until World-Wide, the "rela-
tive importance of state sovereignty and of fairness to the defendant was still largely undeter-
mined." Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 73.
195 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), is a case in which the
absence of an apparent forum interest in proceeding did not cause the court to deny jurisdic-
tion appropriate under party-fairness standards. For cases where admitted government inter-
ests failed to persuade the court to uphold jurisdiction otherwise deficient under party fairness
standards, see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See genera4', Lewis, supra
note 15, at 806-07.
196 Redish, supra note 21, at 1143.
197 Lewis, supra note 15, at 811. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
198 Redish, supra note 21, at 1135. See also Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Uni&d Theog of
Jnurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 450 (1981); Lewis, supra note 15, at 810, 821;
Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192 (1976); Whit-
ten, supra note 31, at 843. Cf. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
CourtJurisdiction , 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 111. But see Jay, supra, at 441.
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terests' 99 are fundamental to a well-run federated system of govern-
ment. The Court's encomiums to those interests are wrong not
because the interests themselves are unimportant, but because they
should not be taken into account in deciding a motion that deter-
mines only the battleground for the parties' dispute. Sovereignty
concerns should not find expression in personal jurisdiction rules that
oust a fair forum of jurisdiction. Instead, respect for the sovereign
rights of the states should be enforced through the development of
meaningful restrictions on choice of law under the full faith and
credit clause.
For example, where no state has a "specific" interest and only
one state has a "general" interest in a controversy,2 0 0 that state's law
should apply, as a matter of constitutional compulsion. 20 1 Similarly,
in a false conflict, i.e., where only one state has a "specific" inter-
est,2 0 2 the single specifically interested state has a sovereignty-based
objection to the application of the law of any other state, and should
enjoy some confidence that whatever forum accepts jurisdiction will
apply the law of the specifically interested state.20 3 The Supreme
Court's unwillingness to impose such restrictions20 4 gives forum
courts a practical incentive to bias their jurisdictional determinations
in favor of jurisdiction, for they may rest secure that, once seized of
jurisdiction, they may apply forum law with constitutional impunity
even absent a specific interest.
Such a bias in favor of accepting jurisdiction, motivated by a
desire to ensure the application of forum law, may run afoul of Ire-
land's strong indication that jurisdictional due process should be "ul-
timately" concerned with the rights of individual litigants. Even the
199 Among other interests, forum states may want to apply their own law to controversies
arising from transactions occurring within their borders, affecting their residents, or implicat-
ing their policies; provide the arena for resolving those controversies, or for that matter any
controversy involving a resident or domiciliary plaintiff; and shield their own statutes from
substantive due process attack. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 822-26; McDougal, supra note 28,
at 13-26. Other states will want to ensure that their own comparable interests are not en-
croached on by the forum's exercise of jurisdiction.
200 See Posnak, supra note 189, at 733-34.
201 Id. at 739 & 739-40 n.38.
202 Id. at 733.
203 Id. at 745-46, 753.
204 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) is the most recent and one of the most
glaring instances of the Court's failure to develop meaningful federal constitutional limita-
tions on choice of law. Commentators have noted that, after Allstate, there are as a practical
matter few or no sovereignty-based constitutional limitations on choice of law rules. Posnak,
supra note 189, at 746-47; Redish, supra note 21, at 1132 n.139; Whitten, supra note 21, at 843.




highest degree of state interest does not assure or even signify that the
forum is a fair one to the defendant. 20 5 The use of a forum state's
interest as even a "tipping" factor for personal jurisdiction may result
in exercises ofjurisdiction that would be considered unfair to the par-
ties if examined independently under fairness standards. On the
other hand, denying the jurisdiction of a fair forum for want of an
identifiable forum state interest superior to the interest of another
state would be manifestly unfair to the plaintiff, who already en-
counters formidable obstacles in demonstrating that the forum is fair
to the defendant.20 6 As a policy matter, resolution of a dispute over
choice of law should not "turn on the fortuity of the plaintiff's choice
of forum. ' 20 7 As a matter of constitutional law, it should be apparent
after Ireland that the individual rights determined by the personal
jurisdiction dispute need not be compromised in the name of sover-
eign interests proclaimed by a self-interested forum.
When the Court has explicitly addressed the overlap between
choice-of-law and personal jurisdiction standards, it has quite prop-
erly rejected the proposition that a state's law-application interest,
standing alone, demonstrates its constitutional adequacy as a fo-
rum.20 8 Nevertheless, choice-of-law concerns still figure in the
Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction decisions, perhaps because the
factors commonly employed to decide both issues significantly over-
lap. Thus the defendant's contacts with the forum state, a primary
test of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe, may also point to-
wards that state as one with a "general" or "specific" interest for
purposes of choice of law. It is therefore no accident that the two
justices, Black and Brennan, who more than any other have sought
to elevate the forum state's interests to a status at least equal to fair-
ness for defendants,20 9 are also the same justices who, in dissent,
would let a state's strong law-application interest be virtually disposi-
tive of its constitutional adequacy as a forum for purposes of personal
205 See Rush, 444 U.S. at 332; Ku/ko, 436 U.S. at 100; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215.
206 Rush, 444 U.S. at 332; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92. See the discussion of the Court's recent
tilt toward the interests of the defendant, as against those of the plaintiff, in Lewis, supra note
15, at 811.
207 See Lewis, supra note 15, at 834.
208 See, e.g., Shaffr, 433 U.S. at 215-16; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
209 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222-23 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting
in part); McGee v. National Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (Black, J., for the Court);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (Black, J., for the Court); Inter-
national Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 322-326 (Black, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction.2 10
The recurrent sovereign interest overtones of the Supreme
Court's personal jurisdiction opinions may well have retarded the de-
velopment of rigorous constitutional principles regulating choice of
law. Although the references to sovereignty do not appear to have
dictated the results of the personal jurisdiction decisions, they may
have fostered the illusion that the Court, through those decisions, has
given adequate consideration to constitutional constraints on choice
of law. If so, the Court may still be underestimating the need to
develop those restrictions in cases where the choice-of-law issue is
raised directly.21
A contrary prediction, that the "Court's new interest [voiced by
World-Wide] in interstate federalism may . . . lead it to more care-
fully examine cases posing choice of law problems, 2t2 remains unful-
filled. The hope was that Alstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,213 then on
certiorari to the Supreme Court, might be the court's vehicle for cre-
ating meaningful constitutional restrictions on choice of law.214 Un-
fortunately, the Court in Allstate dashed this hope, spurning the
opportunity to create those restrictions and. leaving the state courts
substantially free to apply the law of any state that has even the most
tangential relationship to either of the parties or the claim.21 5 In the
process, the Court threw cold water on the conjecture that World-
Wide would usher in an era of "new stability" to the "chronically
elusive areas of constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and
choice of law."2 16
In brief, the Court seems to have committed two conceptual er-
rors in elaborating the interstate sovereignty doctrine. First, the
Court merely sketched a rough blueprint, without ever identifying or
quantifying specific, sovereignty-based interests of states other than
the forum that would suffice to outweigh the party-fairness factors on
which jurisdiction ordinarily depends. Second, and more fundamen-
tally, even if the concept had become associated with particular gov-
ernment interests-for example, a state's interest in having its own
210 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 310 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in
part); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
211 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
212 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 86.
213 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
214 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 85.
215 See note 204 supra.
216 Ripple & Murphy, supra note 15, at 88.
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law applied to a controversy or in providing a forum to resolve it-
the Court should never have factored those interests into decisions on
personal jurisdiction. That the Court did so reflects its inadequate
appreciation of both the limited significance of the motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and the purely individual interests at
stake. Since the Court in Ireland appears to have corrected these mis-
apprehensions, it may be useful to consider the promise the Ireland
opinion holds for the evolution of personal jurisdiction and choice of
law.
B. Larger Implications
It is unclear why Justice Powell would support a state sover-
eignty doctrine that defies precise definition, unfairly threatens both
parties in their quest for a relatively fair forum, makes no decisional
difference, and has, in Ireland, been all but abjured by its most recent
judicial exponent, Justice White. Justice Powell surely is correct,
though, when he observes that the majority, by eliminating the sov-
ereignty factor from the jurisdictional equation, "effects a potentially
substantial change of law" and "could require a sweeping but largely
unexplicated revision of jurisdictional doctrine. 21 7 Contrary to his
suggestion, however, this development is an auspicious one for the
construction of a coherent unified theory of personal jurisdiction and
perhaps for choice of law.
Precisely because the Court did reach so far to discuss the sover-
eignty concept in Ireland, the third death of sovereignty will likely
prove fatal. Moreover, the Court's reasons for holding that the satis-
faction of sovereignty interests is not a sine qua non of personal juris-
diction also undermine the foundations of the other government
interest doctrines that have played such a distracting part in personal
jurisdiction adjudication. The linchpins of the Ireland decision were
the Court's explicit recognition that the due process clause is the sole
source of constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and the
Court's recognition that due process regulates purely personal rights.
We may therefore anticipate the formal repudiation not just of inter-
state sovereignty, but also of the other government interest factors
that have figured in the Court's recent decisions: among others, the
"forum State's interest," the "shared interest of the several States,"
and the "interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies. ' 218 If the sole ultimate concern
217 102 S. Ct. at 2110, 2108.
218 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.
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of jurisdictional due process is to ensure a forum that is relatively fair
as between the parties, then the presence or absence of a forum state
or other governmental interest--of whatever kind or degree and
whether or not articulated through legislation 2 19-should come to be
seen as utterly irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction decision, since
those interests have no necessary bearing on the single pertinent fac-
tor of party fairness.
The Ireland opinion has auspicious potential because it has all
but entirely cleared away this doctrinal debris. In doing so it has
immeasurably eased the task of unifying jurisdictional theory so as to
reconcile the Court's decisions since International Shoe. An illustration
is furnished by the majority in Ireland. The bold declaration of Shafer
v. Heitner that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evalu-
ated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny" 220 had raised some question about the standing of other
post-International Shoe decisions that had upheld jurisdiction based on
express contractual consents or stipulations to jurisdiction. 2 1 In
those situations, or when the defendant waives the personal jurisdic-
tion objection by failing to timely assert it,222 or when the court infers
a plaintiff's constructive consent to be served with a counterclaim,2 23
jurisdiction is exercised without the ordinarily required evidence of
forum contacts by the defendant (or, in the counterclaim case, by the
plaintiff). 224 Yet the Court gives every indication that it strongly ad-
heres to Shafer,225 and thus it evidently considers all these non-con-
tacts-based exercises ofjurisdiction consonant with "the standards set
219 See Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126
(1978); Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IOWA L. REV. 345 (1959).
220 433 U.S. at 212.
221 See,e.g., Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (contractual consent to forum
jurisdiction and "cognovit" provisions confessing judgment there); National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (consent to jurisdiction and appointment of agent for
service); Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956) (stipulation). In Ireland, the
Court referred to the last two cases as among several examples of a "variety of legal arrange-
ments . . . taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the
court." 102 S. Ct. at 2105.
222 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l).
223 The majority in Ireland recognized this example by citing, with approval, Adam v.
Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). 102 S. Ct. at 2105.
224 Even if the defendant in such cases may be said to have had forum contacts, e.g., by
agreeing to litigate there, the plaintiff's claim may not "arise out of" any of these contacts,
and, therefore, jurisdiction could not be upheld on a theory of claim-related forum contacts.
Further, in the same situations, the defendant will often not have reaped substantial forum
benefits in a regular, continuous manner, so that the alternative major test of contacts will
also not be satisfied.
225 See text accompanying notes 77-88 supra.
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forth in International Shoe and its progeny." The conclusion is ines-
capable that, to today's Court, the "standards set forth in International
Shoe" must refer to transcendent criteria of fairness to parties which,
while they may be satisfied by the particularized tests of substantial
or claim-related defendant-forum contacts, are not restricted to
them.
The particularized contacts tests have always served as surro-
gates for these broader indicia of fairness. For example, satisfaction of
the particularized "claim-relatedness" test demonstrates a constitu-
tionally sufficient expectancy by the defendant that the particular
suit might be brought in the forum. A person who has engaged in
certain conduct in or affecting a foreign state should reasonably ex-
pect that he may later be called on to defend that conduct in that
state. This will be the case even if the defendant cannot reasonably
be held to have anticipated any litigation at all.226
The Court's principal alternative particularized test of contacts
is met by regular, continuous and substantial defendant-forum con-
tacts, no one of which need be related to the plaintiff's claim. The
theory is that when the defendant undertook extensive and weighty
forum contacts, he presumably anticipated receiving significant ben-
efits and protections. These, in turn, make it substantively fair to
saddle him with a reciprocal obligation to defend any civil action in
the forum, wholly apart from his expectations as to where a particu-
lar lawsuit might be filed.227
To date, jurisdictional theory has not been able to account for
other, satellite bases of personal jurisdiction like domicile, place of
incorporation, waiver, or consent that do not meet the particularized
tests of claim-related or regular, substantial, non-claim-related forum
contacts. Theoretical unification may be attempted by analyzing
whether jurisdiction on these grounds comports with one of the
broader fairness criteria of expectation or benefit, and hence with the
overarching "standards" of International Shoe.228 For example, juris-
diction in the express consent and waiver situations is readily explica-
ble as consonant with the overall fairness indicator of litigational
expectation, even though jurisdiction on those grounds could not be
justified by reference to the particularized claim-related contacts test
from which that expectation is most commonly inferred.
226 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
227 For a discussion of this regular and continuous contacts test, see Lewis, supra note 15,
at 782-83.
228 The author will undertake this analysis in a forthcoming article.
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Less important for jurisdiction, although surely more impor-
tant 229 for the real interests symbolized by the slogan "state sover-
eignty," Ireland has the salutary potential of spurring the
development of meaningful constitutional restrictions on choice of
law. Once governmental interest concepts are excised from personal
jurisdiction adjudication, the Court may finally be persuaded that
significant constitutional restrictions on choice of law will come
about, if at all, only through cases raising the choice-of-law question
directly, rather than through the back door of jurisdictional
adjudication.
Ireland should hasten that day. At a minimum it should pro-
mote jurisdictional decisions geared exclusively to assessing the rela-
tive fairness of the forum to the parties. By resisting the temptation
to succumb to sovereignty, the Court has freed itself from a formalis-
tic ghost of Pennoyer. Unencumbered by governmental interest bag-
gage, it may continue to chart a course consistent with the individual
rights focus of International Shoe.
229 It is generally agreed that the resolution of a substantial choice-of-law dispute is far
more likely to be outcome determinative than is the resolution of a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. Posnak, supra note 189, at 732, 739 n.37.
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